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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JEFFREY SCOTT BRANDENBURG, Case No. 890197-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Court of Appeals jurisdiction over 
criminal convictions other than first degree and capital 
felonies). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to convict Appellant of 
theft by receiving? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Pertinent statutes and constitutional provisions are 
provided in the addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 2, 1988, Appellant was convicted by a jury 
of theft by receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-408 (R. 51). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
James Etling, general manager of a U-Haul Center 
located at 415 West 2100 South, testified that on September 29, 
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1988, he inspected some of the U-Haul trucks under his care, to 
discover that three cast aluminum ramps, valued at $300 a piece, 
were missing from the trucks (T. 21-25). On October 3, 1988, 
Mr. Etling received a telephone call from Appellant inquiring 
whether Mr. Etling's U-Haul Center was missing any truck ramps 
(T. 25-26). When Mr. Etling indicated that he was missing some 
ramps, Appellant gave him an address where he had found one of 
the ramps (T. 26-27). Mr. Etling thanked Appellant, and then Mr. 
Etling and Garth Meiser, a police officer assigned to locate the 
missing ramps, picked the ramp up at 2nd East and 1900 South, as 
indicated by Appellant (T. 27-29). 
Although Mr. Etling testified that he is empowered to 
and frequently does give discounts to people who return U-Haul 
property to him, Appellant neither asked for nor received any 
compensation for the recovery of the ramp (T. 50-51). 
That afternoon, Appellant called Mr. Etling to inquire 
whether he had been able to recover the ramp (T. 33). When Mr. 
Etling indicated that he had, Appellant said he might be able to 
recover the other ramps, and asked if Mr. Etling would "make it 
worth his while." Mr. Etling expressed his desire to make such a 
transaction, and asked Appellant to contact him later, indicating 
that he would determine exactly what the company was willing to 
do in exchange for Appellant's services (T. 34, 50, 211). 
The next day, Appellant went to Mr. Etling1s U-Haul 
Center and told Mr. Etling that he knew where the ramps were and 
would give them to him, and that he wanted to know what U-Haul 
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would offer for his services (T. 37). Appellant told Mr. Etling 
that it had taken him between five and six hours to recover the 
ramps, and that he thought $50 was a reasonable sum to pay for 
that time (T. 39-40). 
When Mr. Etling indicated that he would rather that 
Appellant bring the ramps to the U-Haul Center without 
compensation, Appellant indicated that he thought his time was 
worth something, and indicated that he could have just sold the 
ramps in West Valley City (T. 41, 57). Appellant never told Mr. 
Etling that he would not return the ramps unless he received the 
$50 (T. 59). Appellant testified that if Mr. Etling couldn't 
pay for the ramps, Appellant would have told him their location, 
but would not have brought them to the U-Haul Center (T. 206). 
Mr. Etling told Appellant to call him later, and Mr. 
Etling called his supervisor to find out what they'd pay for the 
return of the ramps - apparently Mr. Etling thought remuneration 
was appropriate until his supervisor indicated that U-Haul would 
not pay it (T. 37, 39). When Appellant called Mr. Etling back, 
Mr. Etling lied to him, indicating that he was authorized to pay 
Appellant the $50 (T. 40). Mr. Etling told Appellant that Mr. 
Etling could not retrieve the ramps, and asked Appellant to bring 
the ramps to the U-Haul Center (T. 41). Mr. Etling was pressed 
for time, and it was valuable to him to have the ramps recovered 
and returned to the U-Haul Center (T. 49). Appellant said he 
would arrange to have the ramps brought to the U-Haul Center (T. 
41). 
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Minutes after the last phone call, Appellant arrived at 
the U-Haul center on a motorcycle, and he was followed later by a 
van carrying two U-Haul ramps (T. 43-46). The police arrived on 
the scene, and Mr. Etling never paid Appellant for the return of 
the ramps or spoke to him again (T. 47). 
The van carrying the U-Haul ramps was driven by Terry 
Hayes, a friend of Appellant's (T. 61-64). Appellant asked him 
to help him return the ramps to U-Haul so that he could collect a 
finder"s fee (T. 65). Mr. Hayes picked the ramps up from behind 
a house on 7th East and 39th South and took them to the U-Haul 
Center, where he spoke with the police and was later released (T. 
63-67). 
South Salt Lake Police Officer Carl Dinger was wearing 
plainclothes and observing the U-Haul Center when Appellant 
arrived (T. 83). He approached Appellant and identified himself 
as a police officer, asking if Appellant would speak with him for 
a moment (T. 84). Officer Dinger asked Appellant his name, and 
Appellant initially gave the officer his first and middle names, 
and may have given the officer an incorrect home address (T. 94, 
97). Appellant later gave the officer his full name and an 
additional address, and explained that he was at the U-Haul to 
retrieve a finder's fee for returning the ramps (T« 100). He 
explained that he thought the ramps had been stolen by a William 
Parker and told Officer Dinger where Mr. Parker lived (T. 94, 99-
100). 
Eileen Walker testified that she is acquainted with 
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Appellant through her roommate, and that sometime in early 
October of 1988# her landlord ordered her to have an aluminum 
ramp and some other aluminum removed from the apartment complex 
v/here she lived at 1910 South 200 East (T. 111# 121). She called 
Appellant so he would help her move the aluminum, and he came 
over and called the U-Haul company to see if they were missing a 
ramp (T. 113). 
She testified that William Parker used to live in the 
same apartment complex on 1900 South and 200 East before he was 
evicted (T. 119-126). 
Appellant testified that in early October, his friend 
Eileen Walker called him and asked him to remove some aluminum 
scrap and an aluminum ramp from the apartment complex (T. 127). 
He called U-Haul from Ms. Walker's phone and found out which 
Center v/as missing a ramp, and called that Center and told Mr. 
Etling to come get the ramp (T. 129-130). Because Ms. Walker's 
landlord was so upset about the aluminum, Appellant called Mr. 
Etling later that day to insure that the ramp had been removed 
from the apartment complex (T. 133). Mr. Etling was excited by 
the recovery of the ramp, and indicated that he was missing two 
more ramps and would make it worth Appellant's while if he could 
find the other ramps (133-134). 
Appellant attended a party that night, where he spoke 
with William Parker, and as a result of that conversation, 
Appellant called the U-Haul Center to tell them he thought he 
could retrieve the ramps. He also asked them if they were 
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willing to pay him $50 for the necessary efforts to retrieve the 
ramps (T. 134-135). Appellant stated that he found the ramps 
after speaking with William Parker, and that he thought the ramps 
were probably stolen when he was able to find the ramps in 
accordance with Mr. Parker's story (T. 179). 
The ramps were behind an abandoned house located at 
3939 South 700 East, and Mr. Etling's U-Haul Center was located 
at 415 West 2100 South (T. 21, 179, 203). Appellant indicated 
that Mr. Etling asked him to bring the ramps in without any 
payment for his services, at which time Appellant ireminded him 
that he could have just sold the ramps in West Valley City (T. 
137). Appellant indicated that he reminded Mr. Etling that he 
could have taken the ramps to West Valley because Mr. Etling was 
trying to renege on his previous commitment to make it worth 
Appellant's while to recover the ramps (T. 197). Appellant noted 
that the ramps were stamped "U-Haul" and indicated that he 
thought it would be impossible to sell them for scrap, and that 
he had no personal use for the ramps (T. 207). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence that Appellant intended 
to deprive U-Haul of the ramps, under any statutory definition of 
that particular intent. Because the prosecution failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction, 
this Court should reverse Appellant's conviction and declare him 
innocent as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
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I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-408 defines theft by 
receiving and provides, in part: 
(1) A person commits theft if he 
receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, 
withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the owner, 
knowing the property to be stolen, with a 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
.... 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, 
control, or title or lending on the security of 
the property; 
. . . • 
Appellant contends that there is no evidence that 
Appellant intended to deprive U-Haul of their property. The 
standard of appellate review of such a claim of insufficiency of 
the evidence was explained in State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 
1983). The court said: 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient 
evidence, this Court must view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
and will interfere only when the evidence is 
so lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable person could not possibly have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 550. If the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable, this Court must reverse Appellant's 
conviction. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-401 defines "purpose to 
deprive" as follows: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
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conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
There was no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, 
that Appellant intended to permanently deprive U-Haul of the 
ramps, or to dispose of the ramps. While it might be argued that 
Appellant's intent to deprive is described by subsection (b) ("to 
restore property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation"), such a view ignores the facts that Mr. Etling 
could not retrieve the ramps himself, and agreed to make it worth 
Appellant's while to locate and haul the ramps to the U-Haul 
center. 
As noted in the statement of facts, Appellant gave Mr. 
Etling the location of the first $300 ramp, and asked for no 
remuneration for this information. When he learned that Mr. 
Etling was missing and Appellant could find the other two ramps, 
Appellant was acting within reason in expecting to be paid fifty 
dollars for his services in locating the ramps and in bringing 
the tv/o additional $300 ramps from their location at 3939 South 
700 East to the U-Haul Center at 415 West 2100 South. 
Appellant's expectations were particularly reasonable after Mr. 
Etling said that he could not retrieve the ramps himself and 
indicated his willingness to compensate Appellant for his 
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services. Mr. Etling apparently thought compensating Appellant 
was appropriate until his supervisor indicated that U-Haul would 
not pay the $50. Instead of telling Appellant the truth, Mr. 
Etling lied to Appellant, telling him he would pay $50 to get 
the ramps delivered to the store, and then he called the police. 
Mr. Etling could not retrieve the ramps himself and never asked 
Appellant where the ramps were. It appears that he called the 
police so that he could get the ramps retrieved and delivered to 
the U-Haul Center without having to pay the compensation he 
initially thought legitimate. 
Appellant's comment that he could have sold the ramps 
in West Valley came in response to Mr. Etling1s expressing his 
preference that Appellant bring the ramps to the U-Haul Center 
without receiving the compensation that Etling had previously 
agreed to. Appellant never refused to divulge the location of 
the ramps, and testified that if Mr. Etling had told him that he 
could not pay Appellant for his services in returning the ramps, 
Appellant would have told him the location of the ramps. It was 
only after Mr. Etling authorized Appellant to bring the ramps to 
the U-Haul center that Appellant exercised any control over the 
ramps. 
The lack of evidence of Appellant's intent to deprive 
U-Haul of its property is highlighted by comparing the facts of 
this case with those in Hanlon v. State, 441 P.2d 486 (Okl.Cr. 
1968). In Hanlon, a Stradivarius violin, insured at $20,000, was 
stolen from a private residence. Hanlon, a local attorney, was 
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convicted of receiving stolen property in connection with the 
recovery of the violin, and this conviction was reversed on 
appeal. 
Hanlon was apparently contacted by someone trying to 
exchange stolen violins for reward money, and Hanlon went to the 
county attorney's office to determine if the police and 
prosecutors would be interested in retrieving the stolen violins 
through Hanlon. Subsequent dealings between Hanlon, the police, 
the company that insured the violin, and the person who had the 
stolen violin (who was never identified), the insurance company 
agreed to pay $4,000 for the return of the violin. Hanlon met 
the insurance agent and the violin owner at a designated location 
where the violin owner verified that the violin was his and was 
not damaged, and then the insurance agent gave Hanlon a draft for 
$4,000. Hanlon was later charged with receiving stolen goods for 
his participation in the recovery of the violin. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
this charge, the court described the showing of intent required 
of the prosecution: 
[The State must] prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the accused had a fraudulent 
intent accompanying his receiving the stolen 
property: (1) to aid the thief; or (2) hope 
to obtain some personal gain or reward for 
restoring the property to the owner; or (3) 
to derive a benefit or profit from his 
actions in restoring the property to the 
owner. 
Id. at 489. The court found that Hanlon*s intent was clear long 
before he obtained the violin, and that his intent was to return 
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the violin to the rightful owner, rather than to benefit himself 
in some way. I^d. at 492-493. 
As was the case in Hanlon, Appellant had no criminal 
intent - his goal from the beginning to the end of the 
transaction was to return the ramps to their rightful owner. 
Appellant's pursuit of the remuneration that Mr. Etling agreed to 
pay does not detract from Appellant's intent to return the ramps 
to U-Haul. There was no proof that Appellant gained control of 
the ramps with the intent to call U-Haul and extort money from U-
Haul for the return of the ramps. It was only after Mr. Etling 
agreed to make it worth Appellant's while that Appellant located 
the stolen ramps and had them hauled to the U-Haul center. After 
Appellant's tracking down the ramps and arranging to have them 
hauled to the U-Haul Center, Appellant's expectation that Mr. 
Etling would follow through on his original promise to make 
Appellant's services worth his while does not convert Appellant's 
intent that the ramps return to the U-Haul into an intent to 
deprive U-Haul of the ramps. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there was no evidence to support the intent 
element of theft by receiving - that Appellant intended to 
deprive U-Haul of the ramps - no reasonable person could have 
reached the verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
Appellant's conviction should be reversed. Further, because the 
State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the 
verdict, this Court should declare Appellant innocent as a matter 
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of law. State v. Murphy, 617 P. 2d 399, 403 (Utah ,,1980) . 
Respectfully submitted this (jp day of 
1989. 
M-
< r ^ L u)c£t, 
ELIZABETH H.J BOWMAN 
ttorney;fqr Defendant/Appellant 
ui&Mmr— 
Attorney fq>r Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM OF 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-401: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-408 
(1) A person commits theft if he 
receives, retains, or disposes of the 
property of another knowing that it has been 
stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, 
withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the owner, 
knowing the property to be stolen, with a 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
« . . . 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, 
control, or title or lending on the security of 
the property; 
.... 
